Rudolf Otting-Kirvis

German NCO R.Otting, who remained in Lithuania during World War II, became a partisan. After being captured by the Chekists, he betrayed the partisans and went on to serve the Chekists, becoming a member of the SG and later commander of the second group. SGs are special groups organized by the KGB, acting as partisan units. The aim of these groups was to destroy the guerrilla resistance by killing or alive taking the guerrillas and their supporters. Sometimes, without wanting to leave witnesses, they killed civilians by placing guilt on guerrillas. After the partisan armed resistance, Mr Otting was preparing to be transferred abroad, transferred from the MVD's 4th Board to Division 1 and sent to West Germany in 1956. After a while, he confesses to being a KGB agent there. The Russians, apparently well aware of East German intelligence, find out about it and, without R.Otting's knowledge, use it to compromise the famous Lithuanian figure Vaclov Sidzikauskas. One of KGB's most famous KGB agents, Bagdonas-A. Zaskevicius, is sent to West Germany to re-establish contact.He was born in 1923. (to be reported elsewhere next year) in the Saar area, in the town of Saar-Dauteri, where he lived with his parents and three sisters and two brothers until 1941. He graduated from the gymnasium that year and was taken into the army. During the war he served as an auxiliary unit officer in the German army. As the front moved through Lithuania, he became ill and stayed for treatment at a Lithuanian peasant in Suwalki. He worked in the village when he grew up, and in July 1946, He joined the Falcon Company of the Iron Wolf of Tauras County, which was operating in Marijampolė County. April 1947 captured during a military-check operation. The arrestor did not resist and immediately betrayed his well-known bunkers, which killed 4 guerrillas and stormed one alive. Issued 6 liaison officers. "Self-attached" ("zakreplenie" was mostly the cost of life - forcing someone to kill witnesses), in May of that year. it is recruited by a spec. group ideologue and blackmailer MGB 2-N Division 2 Section 5, supra deputy mjr. Sokolov. This is how R. Otting becomes a spec. the agent of the group in the smog, choosing the nickname Ax.

In 1948 he became the first and then the second specialist. leader and stay with the group until the end. Under his leadership, this group killed over 150 guerrillas. He himself killed over 20 guerrillas (about 50 in other notes and even 67). The most famous of his "works" include the following: January 1951. took part in the destruction of two Maironis squad in Ariogala district. Between January and March of the same year, he took part in a challenging combination, clarifying the bunker of Vytautas County Headquarters through liaison officers. 25 guerrillas were killed following the discovery of staff documents in this bunker. March. involved in the capture of a live guerrilla peacock who has betrayed many guerrillas and bunkers. In the same month, he was involved in the killing of Trumpys, a foreigner, and in the arrest of Gardenis. He later participated in the assassination of J. Luksa-Skirmantas-Daumantas. July-August Killed partisans of the Zalgiris group in Skaudvile-Taurage districts. As an example of Ax's ingenuity and courage, the "legendary" (i.e. fictitious, convened by MGB-organized staff) Dainava County guerrilla leaders meeting in 1951 with great efforts by the MGB. There are many such and similar works by the Ax.

When writing about the human qualities of the Kirvis (Ax), the Chekists use the stamps established in Soviet writing - "brave, determined, inventive, correctly orientated in the international situation" and so on. There are others. In one report dated May 16, 1947, mjr. Sokolov writes that Mr Otting is fit to work as a single terrorist. That's a really high rating, because Kagebeists didn't trust even their own bloody agents on the strikes - they had to be together in the woods all the time. By the way, the checkers could have given the agents a different "positive" view of Kirvis' character and activities. One of the agents-Chalna in March 1950. In a written agency report2, he says that SG Shadow's beard was much better before the Ax, and that no one in the strike listens to or respects the striker.

He writes that he speaks German, Lithuanian, Russian and a little French (since he comes from the Saarland). Apparently, he spoke Lithuanian without an accent, otherwise it would have been difficult for him to portray the Lithuanian partisan. He does not know how he wrote it, because there are only Russian and German handwritten letters. Written in Russian with mistakes.

In a report dated 05.01.1954, Kirvis describes his merits in arresting Lithuanian partisans or foreign paratroopers returning from abroad3. He seems to have been involved in all the famous Chekist operations. In April 1950, pretending to be partisans of Lithuania, he met and pronounced a Latvian paratrooper near Palanga, who said that his friend was an MGB agent. After the shooting, the Latvian is captured, brutally interrogated, and handed over to the encyclopaedists.

For such "work", the Kirvis has received 87 cash awards and incentives in the period 1947-1950, totaling over 50,000. rubles4. By the way, this killer in the 1950s. The Presidium of J.Paleckis Supreme Council awarded him with a letter of honor5. It is not known what the regular salary was. According to a report dated 06.06.1950, the agent striker Ax received 2,000. monthly salary. For some time he lived in a dormitory dormitory in N. Vilnia, later married in 1953 - Žuvėdžiai 12-4, in 1955 - Nemenčinė highway 26b-2. For a long time he had the certificate of technician of the Communications Board, later, in 1955, supposedly working as a portrait artist at the Lithuanian Theater Society. According to the testimonies of his wife7 given by the agents, he always had a lot of money, but he was very miserable, counting every kopeck. She was dressed casually, but with pity for his wife's clothes, though she often brought gifts from the "marches." Of course, not everything the second wife said can be believed. (The first wife was a German from his hometown, married in the war, had a son.) Alina Klimovich gave him two daughters, but was a freelance, disorderly woman. About 1954, she lived with her husband as a cat with a dog, until finally out of his home in Nemencine

the highway rolled out and they fell apart. Her chagrin, especially since 1953, when the Kirvis began to train the West for espionage, was a major obstacle for the Chekists.When Mr Otting had already completed his training as a spy in West Germany, the KGB, not dissatisfied with agents' reports of Mr Otting's behavior and moods, also included the 7th Division of the KGB. It was a reconnaissance unit that operated until the collapse of the KGB in Lithuania. In most cases, he received orders to collect data on specific individuals without specifying who needed the data.When Mr. Otting had already completed his training as a spy in West Germany, the KGB, not dissatisfied with agents' reports of Mr Otting's behavior and moods, also included the 7th Division of the KGB. It was a reconnaissance unit that operated until the collapse of the KGB in Lithuania. In most cases, he received orders to collect data on specific individuals without specifying who needed the data. In a note dated 17.07.1955 of this chapter8, signed by chap. Chief of Staff Col. Gorbunov and Subdiv. Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant Igorkin, describes an interview with Mr Otting's wife, A.Klimovich. Her words are as follows: "I will by no means live there, I am afraid of him, i.e. Austin, he will strangle me, he is such a man that he will not shake his hand."So even among those seemingly desperate people - agent strikers - there were those who were still trying to stretch out, like the Sea described in the agency report. Apparently, when they met the people of Lithuania who were fighting in good faith, their conscience broke. In such a situation, people with reckless cruelty, such as Otting, who, among other things, had no patriotic feelings because he was non-Lithuanian, had to control it. By the way, there was another German among the agents' strikers, alias Liutas (Leo)

.As the Kirvis becomes Balandžiu (Dove)

As armed resistance drew to a close, around mid-1953, the Chekists began preparing to take Otting to West Germany as a terrorist against Soviet enemies.

It was first proposed to Moscow to use Otto for terror in West Germany in March 1953.11. Then, an action plan was drawn up, as follows: 12. The plan is entitled: "Plan of active agency-operational measures envisaged by the Lithuanian SSR MGB in acquiring a valuable agency among German Lithuanian nationalists and eliminating nationalists working for foreign intelligence." This plan was published in March 1953. Kondakov, the puppet minister of Lithuania, had to approve the puppet, but apparently Stalin's death, and then the destruction of the Beria security empire, corrected the execution of this grim plan. Moreover, Mr Otting was not sent to West Germany at the scheduled time. The plan itself, apparently made by MGB GRU (Lieutenant Kirkovov, the Chief of Security for the Military Intelligence I Board, the only signatory to this plan), was particularly chekistic, hard on their spirits.

The essence of the plan is as follows. After going to East Germany, R. Otting, who still has the nickname "Ax" in his plan, later goes to West Berlin and West Germany from time to time and tries to recruit some Lithuanian actors and, in case of disagreement, liquidates them. kills. Such a fate was envisioned for Jon Kupst, Wazel, and Father Kipp. All of them are suspected of cooperating with foreign intelligence. The Jesuit father Kipp is considered an agent of the Vatican. As evidence, the MGB agent handed over the Pope's bull to Bishop December in 1947.

There is a separate talk about VLIK and LCK (Central Committee of Lithuania) actors Fr. Krupavicius, Prpalenis, gen. Scribe and Zunde. They say: "Krupavicius, Pralegens, Rastikis, Zunde (see testimony) are convinced enemies of the Soviet authorities, lead the nationalistic activities of Lithuanian emigrants, inspire various provocations against the Soviet Union and its representatives abroad, and send their emissaries to the USSR with terrorist tasks.

In view of the above, in order to expedite American and English agents scheduled to be sent to the USSR and to end the anti-Soviet activities of Lithuanian nationalists abroad, we consider it necessary to launch active measures to acquire a valuable agency and liquidate confident nationalists leading anti-USSR activities. . "

In addition to the ax, two other agents, Sedmoj and Bagdon, must contribute to this. The three of them should kill Kupst (who lived at that time in Karklin's name) first. All three - Kupst, Vase and Father Kipp - had to be killed quickly one after the other, in order to prevent panic among the emigrants. Sedmo was living in East Germany at the time, Bagdon had to come from Lithuania.

It goes on to say: "In order to prevent our Western powers from using anti-Soviet propaganda, and vice versa, to counteract American and English policy on Germany, we consider it appropriate, following the eventual dissolution, of the three American agent-Lithuanian nationalists mentioned above steps:

a) since Agent Sedmoj is of German nationality and lives in the GDR as a German Noiman, he will come with our task and a ready plan to confess to the GDR police and tell him that he was recruited by the American intelligence Cholbom, Karklin and Wazel to whom he was a believer, recommended by priest Kipp. The said intelligence charged him with hatred for the democratic order of the GDR, propagated the inevitability of war, and demanded spying information from him. Sedmo, seeing the advantage of Germany's new democratic development path, refused to follow orders because they clashed with his beliefs and the interests of the German people. As a result, American intelligence officers threatened to give it to the GDR organs. Reflecting on his situation, Sedmoj decided to appear before the GDR authorities himself and, on his own initiative, to liquidate the American agents with whom he was associated, to prove his sincere repentance;

(Sedmojo's detailed statement to the GDR authorities and his conduct will be provided in addition.)

(b) publishing Sedmojo's statement to the GDR. Conduct interviews with correspondents in the GDR and other countries, as appropriate. "

The plan goes on to say that after the massacre, the Ax will reside in Roitin-gene (where VLIK was headquartered) and "identify the Lithuanian nationalist leaders Krupavičius, Pruolenis, Raktis and others, and examine whether they can be recruited on a case-by-case basis. In addition, Ax can be tasked with re-establishing contact with our preserved agency in Germany. "

Another German can be sent to help the Kirvis - Liutas, who has been an agent striker in Lithuania and is also known for his rare brutality.Over 70 guerrillas, including a number of commanders, have been murdered or brutally murdered.So the GRU lieutenant's murder plan was grandiose, thank goodness he had failed. But that doesn't mean the Russians haven't done anything like that. Remember Gen. Kubiliūnas, other Lithuanians from Germany, invasions of VLIK headquarters. The KGB's April Plans from 1955 to 1956 do not declare the killings, but this does not mean that they did not exist at all. After Stalin's death, the Chekists were killing more cautiously, often by instructing their satellites, say Bulgarian security guards.

So, with such things going on, R. Otting has been in the business since 1954. March 1, dismissed from the second spec. Group leader13, and since 1955. transferred to Division I (Intelligence) on 15 May.

In the final decision on whether to send to West Germany, Mr Otting is tested in various ways, and various "legends" are created for him, i.e. a false biography of him. Its characteristics point to weaknesses: it has no authority amongst strikers and is too fragile15. But apparently his other qualities overshadowed these, and he is still preparing to be transferred to West Germany, albeit as early as 1953. September 19 In his letter to the 2nd Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Minister of the Interior of puppet Lithuania Vildžiūnas doubts16 whether it is expedient to send the ax to West Germany, as he may disclose the great secrets of the MVD, for example, known to live captured American intelligence agents used in radio games. (Radio games - when captured live opponent's intelligence is forced to read messages as their own; the Russians used a lot of Western intelligence or persons who came to form partisan contacts for these radio games.) spec. of agents who were used to kill guerrillas. Such doubts may have delayed the transformation of the Ax into April, but did not completely prevent its preparation.

Changing the ax legend several times, i.e. false biography. Initially, the KGB Division of the Puppetry Lithuania had prepared a version as if Ax had lived in East Germany for a long time. The Moscow GRU, as well as the Ax himself, was worried that he had sent several letters from his home country to Saarland in the post-war period and doubted that he would be able to prove his long presence in East Germany. The PGU recommended in 1955 that the ax be sent along with German war criminals17, most of whom were then released from Soviet camps. However, with such a war criminal's "autobiography", the Ax himself was scared to leave, and the Chekists in Lithuania were afraid, because such a version would have been very easy to uncover - no witnesses would have come to confirm that he was sitting in the same camp with the Ax. Then another version of the biography was created, which later also served as an ax to the West, helping him easily defraud West German security organs and even get himself into police service. It was invented as follows: After the war, the ax stays in Lithuania, becomes involved in the partisan movement, is arrested and tried as a partisan Lithuanian. Only after Adenauer arrives in Moscow he confesses to being German and asks to be released from the camp and then asks to leave for West Germany. Creating such a version seeks out a camp in which German prisoners would not be imprisoned. Such is found in the Gorky area, and the Ax, who has gone there, becomes lively for half a month, learning about the order of the camp, the behavior of the prisoners, the feeding, the work, and so on. He is prepared with 10 pages. booklet entitled "Certificate of prisoners' regime and conditions of detention in Lithuanian SSR MVD Prison No. 1 and their transportation in a prisoner's wagon (1947)". It is interesting that the ideal behavior of the Chekists and the holding of the prisoner are described. Only one point states that, although the interrogation cells are for four, they often hold 5-6 people. April also visits Lukiskes Prison, the Stolypin wagon used to transport prisoners to camps, and learns about other prisoners' surroundings.

1955 February. The ax makes lists of his "fighting friends" 18. In the first he lists those - exactly 20 who were still in SG and then 16 - with whom he had "worked" before. Claims that they all knew he was a German from Germany, but no one knew his real name.

The second point of the April Preparation Plan was about communications. Here's what it says19: "When composing and refining the entire legend and its details, the agent's relationship with the center was checked when he left for Germany."

In doing so, both the operative staff and the agent had in mind that initially the agent would be investigated and checked by counterintelligence for a shorter or longer period in the VFR. Since the agent has no relatives in the GDR and there is no need to go there, the main means of communication during this period must be by means of secret fictitious addresses. It is anticipated that only in the last resort will the liaison officer visit him and present himself with a password. To this end, the agent was trained to write the secret and interpret it.

Two fictitious addressees in Lithuania were selected - both in Vilnius district, one in Zveriliskes and the other in Virsuliskes villages, both KGB agents.

In order to keep the connection going, several communication instructions are prepared, which Dove signs when he learns. In addition to correspondence and, as a last resort, contact with a liaison officer, communication via secret sites is also envisaged. In order to make the right choice, April is training in Vilnius and points out his mistakes in choosing one place or another. As a convenient and difficult to notice, the following method is indicated - a green plasticine-clad message is pressed against a green bench from below, and a black plasticine-clamped message is attached to a stump. April was supposed to hand over information and documents through such hiding places, and was left with money and instructions.

The third point of preparation for April  was "Introduction to working methods for policemen and counterintelligence bodies in bourgeois states." April was trained to collect intelligence himself through people working on objects important to Russian intelligence, who were unaware that they were giving it to them (in the Czech term "working in the dark"). It was pointed out in April that the most convenient way to collect intelligence would be to set up an intelligence agency or organization itself. It is advisable to join any bourgeois party in order to gain confidence.

The whole Dove training was culminated in a meeting with the Vice-President of the puppet Lithuanian KGB. Col. Sinycin, who blessed for successful work. Unfortunately, Moscow rated the work of the Vilnius Chekists poor. Earlier, in the autumn of 1955, Moscow had expressed its dissatisfaction with the slow and hesitant work of Vilnius Chekists in preparing April for work abroad.Agent April this year January 12 a group of amnestied German prisoners of war was sent to Germany.

Working with Dove in Moscow, it turned out that he was ill-prepared by the Lithuanian KGB Division I staff. He is completely untrained in getting rid of tracking and even the simplest ways to protect yourself. The agent has a rather poor understanding of the secret connection, of the selection and use of the secret sites, of the simple containers he has acquired, not from the work of the First Division, but from his previous work in dealing with nationalist gangs.

The first chapter has not fully developed the agent's legend, and there are quite a few places where the agent could put himself in a difficult position when speaking abroad.

The first chapter also developed poorly on communication with Dove. Particularly unsuccessful was the masking of the means of secrecy, a book in German, published in the GDR in 1955. Having a book like this for someone returning from a correctional camp is abnormal and can draw unnecessary police attention. Also, crossing the demarcation line can simply be taken away by border guards.

Apparel April made the mistake of dressing him in brand new clothes. The agent's well-hands also did not fit in with the legend he had prepared.

We had to fundamentally change the legend and the terms of communication with April and reintroduce it to the basic rules of personal security, but due to lack of time we could not fill all the gaps that the agent made in preparing the first section of the Lithuanian KGB under MT. As a result, the agent was given limited tasks to settle in, familiarize himself with the environment, and create opportunities for intelligence work. Specific tasks will be given once he has entered the GDR.

Because the secret recipe used by Chapter One to send April its instructions was completely untrue, we will teach the agent how to find and read the micrographs.

On leaving Moscow, April suddenly said that he felt offended by the leadership of the first branch of the Lithuanian KGB, who had promised him Soviet citizenship and had promised to join the party but had failed to live up to his promise. In addition, April stated that when he left Vilnius for Moscow, he was told that Soviet citizenship would be formalized by an operative in Moscow when sent abroad.

When sending the new legend, engagement, and terms of communication that have been agreed with April, we would like to bring to the attention of management and relevant Unit 1 staff their ease in educating and preparing Dove .So, although with obstacles, the Ax becomes Dove and 1956. month of January. departs for a new checklist task. Meanwhile, in 1958, September 22 At the request of ex-wife at Vilnius III Notary Law Office, pil. Rudolf Austin is recognized as unknown wherever he is23. April left all the documents with the big money savings book to the checkers (as collateral?) And they are now in his file.

Provocations against V.Sidzikauskas. The paths of two murderers

Apparently, after entering his former family, a very solemn meeting with the residents of his town (one of the last to return from the USSR), well-established, and taking up his job as a policeman, Mr Otting decided not to risk any more. As a violinist in Lithuania, he wrote gritty writings asking the KGB to grant him USSR citizenship and later to be accepted into the party. Neither did he receive. True, he was issued a passport of Rudolf Austin, born in 1924 in Klaipeda district. Issued on 1 November 1930 in the name of the village of Rudaičiai, in the name of Kaunas 4th Military Division24. | He was also hesitant to accept the party - even with the Chekists' eyes, Ax was apparently too odious. So, a man of this kind of spin who realizes which side is in power and worships it, turns his head over again - maybe the fourth - in Germany, he returns to his own, declaring himself a KGB agent, becoming a respectable burger. (After fiercely fighting for the Führer, then joining the Lithuanian partisan ranks, later issuing the partisans and becoming the strangest Chekist tool - agent smog.) To "awaken" him or force him to commit, the KGB sends an experienced Division I to West Germany agent Bagdon, who visits Mr Otting several times.

Events went like this. PGG learned that a Soviet agent working as a police officer in the Land of Saarland was a KGB agent by the German security services, on 19.10.1960 (GPG - Perv Glavna Upravlenie - First High Command - KGB intelligence unit with high autonomy in the KGB system;, which in 1989 employed about 40 Chekists and consisted of four subdivisions: two of them for scientific-technical espionage, the other two for political espionage and recruitment of Lithuanian expatriates). That April did not want to work for the Chekists from the beginning. He apparently did not confess to German intelligence, as they would have thought they would have been interested in Agent Bagdon, who had visited twice in April and returned happily to Lithuania. On 13 July 1959, when he brought Mr Otting with a counterfeit passport under the surname Kellner to travel to meet KGB residents26, Bagdon insisted that April come to Berlin, but he did not arrive. May 1960 he categorically refused to go to East Germany and, on 28 September 1960, when he was sent a request to come to Vienna, did not appear again, on the grounds that he had not been on leave. By 1960, Otting had already introduced himself to German intelligence and, apparently, because of April's not-so-high intelligence, he decided not to engage in complex games with Russian intelligence. Just advised him to break ties with the KGB. But before, as mentioned, Mr. Otting worked sluggishly and reluctantly. During his second meeting with Bagdon, he gives some insight into the structure of the German police, apparently agrees to move to work with Americans whose military bases were adjacent, but then avoids any meetings27. The Russians quickly learn of Otting's passing and, unlike German intelligence, decide to make the most of it. They pretend to believe in Otting and spread false knowledge through it, which, once reached the West, may have compromised many emigration figures.Apparently, after entering his former family, a very solemn meeting with the residents of his town (one of the last to return from the USSR), well-established, and taking up his job as a policeman, Mr Otting decided not to risk any more. As a violinist in Lithuania, he wrote gritty writings asking the KGB to grant him USSR citizenship and later to be accepted into the party. Neither did he receive. True, he was issued a passport of Rudolf Austin, born in 1924 in Klaipėda district. Issued on 1 November 1930 in the name of the village of Rudaičiai, in the name of Kaunas 4th Military Division24. | He was also hesitant to accept the party - even with the Chekists' eyes, Ax was apparently too odious. So, a man of this kind of spin who realizes which side is in power and worships it, turns his head over again - maybe the fourth - in Germany, he returns to his own, declaring himself a KGB agent, becoming a respectable burger. (After fiercely fighting for the Führer, then joining the Lithuanian partisan ranks, later issuing the partisans and becoming the strangest Chekist tool - agent smog.) To "awaken" him or force him to commit, the KGB sends an experienced Division I to West Germany agent Bagdon, who visits Mr Otting several times.

Events went like this. PGG learned that a Soviet agent working as a police officer in the Land of Saarland was a KGB agent by the German security services, on 19.10.1960 (GPG - Perv Glavna Upravlenie - First High Command - KGB intelligence unit with high autonomy in the KGB system;, which in 1989 employed about 40 Chekists and consisted of four subdivisions: two of them for scientific-technical espionage, the other two for political espionage and recruitment of Lithuanian expatriates). That Dove did not want to work for the Chekists from the beginning. He apparently did not confess to German intelligence, as they would have thought they would have been interested in Agent Bagdon, who had visited twice in April and returned happily to Lithuania. On 13 July 1959, when he brought Mr Otting with a counterfeit passport under the surname Kellner to travel to meet KGB residents26, Bagdon insisted that April come to Berlin, but he did not arrive. May 1960 he categorically refused to go to East Germany and, on 28 September 1960, when he was sent a request to come to Vienna, did not appear again, on the grounds that he had not been on leave. By 1960, Otting had already introduced himself to German intelligence and, apparently, because of April's not-so-high intelligence, he decided not to engage in complex games with Russian intelligence. Just advised him to break ties with the KGB. But before, as mentioned, Mr Otting worked sluggishly and reluctantly. During his second meeting with Bagdon, he gives some insight into the structure of the German police, apparently agrees to move to work with Americans whose military bases were adjacent, but then avoids any meetings27. The Russians quickly learn of Otting's passing and, unlike German intelligence, decide to make the most of it. They pretend to believe in Otting and spread false knowledge through it, which, once reached the West, may have compromised many emigration figures. The story of R. Otting-Ax-April could be completed. If he was still alive (now about 70), there would be plenty to tell the interrogators about the activities of the Chekists. Although, in fact, there are dozens of such Axes walking in Lithuania.

So we stand out with Mr Otting, looking back at his grim life and taking a bit of the veil of the KGB. The Chekists who released April abroad only partially succeeded - they offset the loss of the agent by spreading misinformation. But not all spies behaved like Mr Otting. The Russians had quite a few who, for various reasons, worked faithfully for them all the time. Such was the case of Bagdon, who, although not a provocator of Markulis's importance, a spy, but not Ax, a former executioner. Bagdon "worked" as a recruiting agent, so he was a man of persuasion.